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I. INTRODUCTION
The growing nexus between international trade and environmental
protection has brought a great deal of the underlying tension between
the goals and objectives of the two widespread disciplines to the fore-
front of international relations. 1 In particular, representatives of both
the trade and environmental communities have noted the potential for
inherent conflict between the trade provisions of International Environ-
mental Agreements (IEAs) and the liberalized trade principles of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).'
This paper will attempt to carve through the rhetoric and distrust
both sides have exhibited on this issue' and assess the merits of the
claim that trade provisions of three prominent international environ-
mental agreements4 are inconsistent with the GATT.5 This paper also
1. The general dimensions of the trade and environment relationship have been
discussed in several recent articles and symposia. See Steve Charnovitz, The Regula-
tion of Environmental Standards by International Trade Agreements, 16 INT'L ENVTL.
REP. (BNA) 631 n.17 (Aug. 25, 1993); Peter L. Lallas, NAFTA and Evolving Ap-
proaches to Identify and Address "Indirect" Environmental Impacts of International
Trade, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 519 (1993); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Trade
and Environment: Free International Trade and Protection of the Environment: Irrec-
oncilable Conflict?, 86 AM. J. INT'L. L. 700 (1992); Symposium, Trade and the Envi-
ronment: The Role of Regional Trade Agreements, 5 GEO. INT'L. ENVTL. L. REV. 3,
515 (1993); Symposium, Environmental Quality and Free Trade: Interdependent
Goals or Irreconcilable Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 4 (1992); TRADE AND
ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE OF NACEPT, THE GREENING OF WORLD TRADE, (Jan
McAlpine & Patricia LeDonne eds., 1993) [hereinafter NACEPT REPORT]; Trade
and the Environment, 23 ENVTL. L. 3, 387 (1993).
2. See GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, TRADE AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT (Feb. 12, 1992) [hereinafter GATT TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT REPORT]. See
also NACEPT REPORT, supra note 1.
3. As one newspaper report noted:
The Green view of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is
succinctly expressed on thousands of anonymously produced posters littering
the streets of Paris, Tokyo and Washington, featuring a monstrous Gattzilla
devouring the globe, smashing -the Capitol building, spilling DDT with one
hand and squeezing a dolphin to death with another.
Nancy Dunne, Fears over "Gattzilla the Trade Monster," FIN. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1992,
at 3. See also, Schoenbaum, supra note 1, at 704, where it has been noted that "[t]he
environmentalists who argue that free trade will destroy the environment are short-
sighted and wrong."
4. This paper will limit its analysis to the trade provisions of the United Nations
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 1085 (1973)
[hereinafter CITES]; Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, UN Doc. UNEP/IG/80/3 (1989), partially
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evaluates the feasibility of a potential temporary solution to the alleged
conflict: a waiver of all GATT obligations applicable to the trade mea-
sures of the IEAs.
Part II of this study presents an overview of the GATT and its
basic principles. Parts III and IV examine the use-of-trade provisions in
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora (CITES), the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal
(Basel Convention), and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that De-
plete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol). Parts III and IV will also
examine the potential for inconsistencies with the GATT. Part V
presents a brief analysis of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties and its relationship to the IEAs and GATT. Part VI offers a thor-
ough examination of a GATT waiver's applicability to the trade obliga-
tions of the IEAs.
II. GATT PRINCIPLES
In order to understand the areas of potential conflict between
GATT and International Environmental Agreements (lEAs), one must
comprehend the major underlying principles that govern all functions
of the GATT.' Article I establishes the Most-Favoured-Nation princi-
ple (MFN). The MFN principle aims to ensure that each contracting
party "immediately and unconditionally" grants to all other con-
tracting parties equal treatment for their similar import and export
products.7 MFN effectively requires all contracting parties to treat
products from other contracting parties equally. Article III establishes
the National Treatment Principle which requires contracting parties to
treat any imported product in the same manner as they treat domestic
products.8 National Treatment is designed to prevent discrimination
against imported products that would secure advantages for domestic
products. Article XI establishes a prohibition on quantitative restric-
reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657 (entered into force May 1992) [hereinafter Basel Conven-
tion]; Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
26 I.L.M. 1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187
[hereinafter GATT].
6. Although GATT has technically never come into force, it is applied by the
1947 Protocol of Provisional Application (PPA) and is considered a binding treaty obli-
gation in theory and in the practice of the parties. See John H. Jackson, Changing
GATT Rules in NACEPT REPORT, supra note 1, at 105.
7. GATT, supra note 5, art. I, at 96.
8. Id. art. III, at 204.
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tions and seeks to prohibit such trade actions as quotas, embargoes, and
licensing schemes on imported or exported products.9
If a contracting party is challenged with violating any of the above
principles, they have recourse to the GATT General Exceptions.10 Arti-
cle XX(b) and (g) are the exceptions most frequently cited in trade
disputes that involve the environment and natural resources." Article
XX(b) allows contracting parties to take measures "necessary to pro-
tect human, animal or plant life or health;" 12 and XX(g) allows mea-
sures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption."I
When a trade dispute arises between contracting parties, Article
XXII encourages the parties to enter into informal negotiations to re-
solve the impasse.1" If an agreement cannot be reached through consul-
tation, the parties can request the GATT Council 8 to appoint a GATT
Dispute Resolution panel to settle the disagreement in accordance with
Article XXIII. The panel hearings are between governments and are
generally closed to the public and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). 6 In practice, the burden of proving that the trade measure is
justified and/or falls within one of the GATT Article XX exceptions is
on the party seeking to invoke the exception.17 The primary aim of the
9. Id. art. XI.
10. Article XX only permits exceptions when it can be shown that the "measures
are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifi-
able discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade." Id. art. XX, Preamble.
11. See, e.g. Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on
Cigarettes, GATT Doc. DS1O/R 208-09, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE: BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 200 (37th Supp. 1990) (en-
tered into force Nov. 7, 1990); Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed
Herring and Salmon, GATT Doc. L/6268, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE: BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 98 (35th Supp. 1988) (en-
tered into force Mar. 22, 1988); United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
GATT Doc. DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991) (not adopted by the GATT Council), 30 I.L.M.
1594, 1606-07 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin Report].
12. GATT, supra note 5, art. XX(b).
13. Id. art. XX(g).
14. Id. art. XXII.
15. The GATT Council serves as the executive chamber of the GATT and most
contracting parties have representatives within the Council. See generally JOHN H.
JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 154 (1969).
16. Durwood Zaelke et al., Frictions Between International Trade Agreements
and Environmental Protections, NACEPT REPORT, supra note 1, at 51.
17. Id. at 48.
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dispute resolution process is to maintain the lines of communication
between the parties in the interest of upholding the GATT system.18
However, if a contracting party fails to comply with a panel decision
that has been accepted by the full GATT Council, the contracting par-
ties may suspend the application of their respective GATT obligations
towards the recalcitrant party.19
III. TRADE MEASURES AND THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
AGREEMENTS
A. Why Do International Environmental Agreements Use Trade
Provisions?
The GATT Secretariat has identified seventeen international envi-
ronmental agreements that contain a variety of trade provisions.2 0 The
reasons and rationales behind employing trade measures often vary
with the subject matter of the agreement. Generally, many IEAs em-
ploy trade provisions to accomplish objectives that parties to the agree-
ment deem to be in their individual and collective interests. 1 These
goals include: i) the attainment of the environmental objective of the
agreement itself; ii) the encouragement of greater support among na-
tions for the agreement; iii) the elimination of incentives that en-
18. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 112 (1989).
19. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXIII:2.
20. GATT TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT REPORT, supra note 2, Appendix 1. These
agreements and the date they were signed include: Convention Relative to the Preser-
vation of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State (1933), Convention on Nature Pro-
tection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere (1940), International
Convention for the Protection of Birds (1950), African Convention on the Conservation
of Nature and Natural Resources (1968), Benelux Convention on the Hunting and
Protection of Birds (1970), Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora (1973), Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears
(1973), Convention for the Conservation and Management of the Vicuna (1980), Con-
vention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals (1957), Montreal Protocol on Sub-
stances That Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987), European Convention for the Protection
of Animals during International Transport (1968), International Plant Protection
Agreement (1951), Plant Protection Agreement for the South East Asia and Pacific
Region (1956), Phyto-sanitary Convention for Africa (1967), Agreement Concerning
the Cooperation in the Quarantine of Plants and their Protection against Pests and
Diseases (1959), Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (1989), ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation
of Nature and Natural Resources (1985). Id.
21. For a brief discussion of the reasons why countries join and comply with IEAs,
see ANDREW HURRELL AND BENEDICT KINGSBURY (eds.), THE INTERNATIONAL POLIT-
ICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 22-25 (1992).
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courage non-party nations to take environmental and economic advan-
tage of other nations that are parties to the agreement.
For example, lEAs utilize trade measures to discourage or prohibit
the transfer from one nation to another of the actual product or sub-
stance that is the "target" of the agreement. Thus, lEAs may specifi-
cally seek to control the trade in endangered species, hazardous waste,
or substances that deplete the ozone layer because trade in these areas
has been deemed harmful to the environment. 22
Secondly, trade provisions in lEAs will often attempt to use a
"carrot-and-stick" approach to create incentives for non-parties to be-
come parties to the agreement. The existence of trade sanctions and
preferences may spur the development of a strong national interest in
becoming a party to the IEA. Incentives to join may be as concrete as
the continuance of a market presence in the prohibited substance or as
subtle as diplomatic pressure accompanied by the fear of international
isolation. 23 The special concerns of developing countries also play a
large role in this context. lEAs may use trade measures as incentives to
encourage reluctant and skeptical developing countries to become par-
ties to the agreement.2 4 The use of special delays in compliance or
agreements on facilitating technology transfer may also be incorporated
into an lEA.25
Finally, the existence of non-parties to IEAs acting as "free rid-
ers" poses several different problems for the parties to the agreement.
In general, free riders derive the environmental benefits of the IEAs
without having to pay any of the costs. Trade measures may be used to
counter competitive economic advantages that industries in non-party
countries may enjoy as a result of the increased costs of compliance
with the LEA in member nations.26 Non-parties may also seek to pros-
per by filling the market vacuum left behind by the various prohibitions
imposed on parties. 27 Thus an elimination of free riders will, in all like-
lihood, lead to more members of the lEA and a strengthening of the
global consensus on the international environmental issue. If free riders
22. See infra part III(B),(C),(D).
23. HURRELL AND KINGSBURY, supra note 21, at 24.
24. For example, developing countries may be hesitant to become parties to lEAs
because of concerns regarding the costs of compliance and the inequities of forgoing
the use of a banned substance at the expense of potentially less revenue and a slower
pace of economic development. Thus, the Montreal Protocol is one example of an TEA
that has included special ten-year compliance delay provisions for qualifying developing
countries. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 5.
25. Id.
26. RICHARD E. BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY 91 (1991).
27. Id.
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are able to reap rewards for non-compliance, membership in IEAs will
more than likely be reduced substantially.28
B. United Nations Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)
The worldwide trade in wildlife is now estimated to be valued at
$5-$8 billion a year. 9 For several species such as the African elephant,
the Orinoco crocodile, the Sumatran rhinoceros, and other wildlife that
are in high demand on the international market, trade represents a
powerful and direct threat to their continued existence. 80
The United Nations Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) recognizes in its Pre-
amble that "international cooperation is essential for the protection of
certain species of wild fauna and flora against over-exploitation
through international trade."3 1 CITES, originally drafted in 1973 and
currently in force with 113 parties, invokes trade restrictions and regu-
lations to protect listed species of animals and plants threatened with
extinction, and protects species deemed endangered unless trade is
strictly regulated.32 The Convention prohibits, through a permit sys-
tem, the import or export of listed wildlife and wildlife products unless
a scientific finding is made that the trade in question will not threaten
the existence of the species.33 The objective is to eliminate the eco-
nomic incentive to exploit a particular species by destroying the inter-
national market demand for the wildlife product. Articles III, IV, and
V of CITES regulate international trade in listed species with parties
and non-parties.3 4 Article X allows trade in listed species with non-
parties, if the non-party provides documentation that conforms with the
provisions of CITES.3"
C. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel Convention)
The increased shortage of waste management capacity in many
28. HURRELL AND KINGSBURY, supra note 21, at 22-25.
29. Hilary F. French, Reconciling Trade and the Environment in WORLDWATCH
INSTITUTE, STATE OF THE WORLD 1993 158, 162 (1993).
30. Id.
31. CITES, supra note 4, Preamble.
32. Id. Appendix I and II.
33. Id. art. III 2(a)-3(a), IV(a).
34. Id. art. III, IV, V (emphasis added).
35. Id. art. X.
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countries, and the prohibitive costs associated with building large-scale
disposal facilities in nations that may produce relatively small amounts
of hazardous waste, have contributed substantially to the increase in
global hazardous waste export."6 In addition, several high-profile inter-
national incidents have focused dramatic attention on the economic and
political pressure many developing nations face when confronted with a
shipment of hazardous waste from the developed world.3 7 According to
NGO analysts, ten million tons of waste have been exported over the
past several years and more than half of the waste has been delivered
to the relatively weaker-regulated areas of the world in Eastern Europe
and several developing countries. 8 Despite the benefit of profit realiza-
tion that these shipments offer, developing nations often have limited
disposal capability. Shipments frequently present the problem of poten-
tial contamination of groundwater, surface water, soil, and air if waste
is dumped illegally.3 9
In response to these and other concerns, the United Nations Envi-
ronment Programme (UNEP) sponsored the negotiations of the 1989
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Haz-
ardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel Convention).40 The Basel
Convention prohibits exports of waste to parties or non-parties unless it
can be demonstrated that the importing nation "will manage the waste
in an environmentally sound manner."4 Article 4(5) provides that a
party shall not permit hazardous waste or other wastes to be exported
to or imported from a non-party unless that party enters into a bilat-
eral, multilateral, or regional agreement regarding transboundary
movement of waste with the non-party pursuant to Art. 11.11 In trans-
36. Notification Concerning the Basel Convention's Potential Implications for
Hazardous Waste Exports and Imports, 57 Fed. Reg. 20602 (1992).
37. One particular incident involved the ship Khian Sea. The vessel left Philadel-
phia in August 1986 bound for Haiti with 15,000 tons of incinerator ash (the shipping
papers falsely indicated the cargo was construction material and fertilizer). When Ha-
iti refused the shipment, the Khian Sea left on a two-year search for a country that
would accept the waste. The ship's name was changed several times and after several
ports refused its cargo, it arrived in Singapore under a different name and with the ash
allegedly dumped in the Indian Ocean. In June 1993, the owners of the Khian Sea
were convicted of illegal ocean dumping and perjury for denying the ash had been
dumped. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (Supplement)
338 (1993).
38. French, supra note 29, at 165.
39. Notification Concerning the Basel Convention's Potential Implications for
Hazardous Waste Exports and Imports, 57 Fed. Reg. 20602, 20603 (1992).
40. Basel Convention, supra note 4.
41. Id. at art. 4(2)(e) (emphasis added).
42. Id. at art. 4(5).
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fers between parties, other conditions require the exporter to receive
the prior informed consent of the importing party and any other parties
through whose territory the waste will be transported.43 In addition, a
party may only export hazardous waste if it lacks the technical capac-
ity, necessary facilities, or suitable domestic waste-disposal sites.44 The
Basel Convention went into force in May 1992 and, as of June 1992,
had been ratified by 21 of its 53 signatory parties.48
D. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
(Montreal Protocol)
In the past two decades, scientific evidence has increasingly estab-
lished a strong link between the depletion of the stratospheric ozone
layer and the release into the atmosphere of chlorine and bromine-
laden chemicals such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), halons, carbon
tetrachloride, methyl chloroform, and fully halogenated CFCs.,' The
stratospheric ozone layer acts as a shield to protect the earth against
the harmful effects of ultraviolet radiation. A decrease in stratospheric
ozone could potentially lead to the increased incidence of skin cancer,
cataracts, suppression of the immune system, crop damage, and harm
to the marine food chain.47 As an initial effort to respond to these and
other serious consequences of ozone depletion, the 1985 Vienna Con-
vention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer provided a general com-
mitment by its signatories to cooperate in protecting the ozone layer.48
In 1987, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer (Montreal Protocol) established specific commitments by the
parties to reduce their consumption and production of CFCs by 50% of
1986 levels by 1999."0 As evidence of ozone depletion grew, and scien-
tific assessments indicated further deterioration of the ozone layer over
Antarctica, the parties to the Montreal Protocol agreed in 1990 at
43. Id. at art. 6(4).
44. Id. at art. 4(9)(a).
45. In signing the Convention, a country indicates that it agrees with the goals of
the Convention and is moving towards ratification. Ratification is acknowledgement of
a country's ability to implement the provisions of the Convention. See Notification
Concerning the Basel Convention's Potential Implications for Hazardous Waste Ex-
ports and Imports, supra note 39, at 20603.
46. Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 57 Fed. Reg. 33755 (1992).
47. Id.
48. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Sept. 22, 1987, 26
I.L.M. 1516 (1987).
49. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 2. Halon production is to be frozen at
1986 levels. Id.
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London to speed up their commitments by calling for a phase-out of
the consumption and production of CFCs, halons, and carbon tetra-
chloride by the year 2000 and methyl chloroform by 2005.50 The
Fourth Meeting of the Parties at Copenhagen in November 1992 accel-
erated the timetable for the complete production phase-out of CFCs,
carbon tetrachloride, and methyl chloroform by 1996, and halons by
1994.51
The Montreal Protocol uses trade restrictions to encourage partici-
pation in the agreement, to prevent non-parties from gaining a compet-
itive advantage at the expense of parties, and to inhibit the flow of
ozone depleting substance (ODS) production facilities to non-party
countries. 52 Article 4 prohibits the import and export of controlled sub-
stances" to and from non-parties unless the non-party has demon-
strated its full compliance with the control measures under the Proto-
col.54 Limited trade in quota production levels and controlled
substances is allowed among parties to promote economic efficiency and
to act as an incentive for non-parties to join the Protocol." The export
of technology or financial aid to non-parties to assist in the manufac-
ture of controlled substances is strongly discouraged. 56
Article 4:3 and Article 4:4 call upon the parties to ban the import
of products containing ODS and examine the feasibility of banning im-
ports of products produced with ozone depleting substances from non-
parties, respectively. 57 The restrictions on products containing or pro-
duced with ODS are considered a crucial element in discouraging the
shift by parties of ODS-manufacturing facilities to offshore pollution
havens in an attempt to circumvent their responsibilities under the Pro-
tocol." The Montreal Protocol has been in force since January 1, 1989
50. London Adjustments and Amendments to the Protocol, Aug. 10, 1992, 30
I.L.M. 537 (1991). As of May 21, 1993, 62 nations had deposited their instruments of
acceptance. 57 Fed. Reg. at 33756 (1992).
51. Copenhagen Adjustments and Amendments to the Protocol, Nov. 25, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 874 (1993). Methyl bromide is also to be frozen at 1991 levels by 1995.
52. BENEDICK, supra note 26, at 91.
53. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, Annex A.
54. Id. art. 4 (emphasis added).
55. Id. art. 2.
56. Id. art. 4(5), (6).
57. Id. art. 4(3), (4) (emphasis added).
58. BENEDICK, supra note 26, at 92. The parties to the Montreal Protocol were
concerned that a party could commit to specific reductions within its boundaries and
then use a non-party for all its ODS-use needs. The result would be no effective reduc-
tion in the world's use of ODS and a disincentive to the development of ozone friendly
substitutes. Id.
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and had 86 parties as of October 1992."
IV. CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE IEAs AND THE GATT
A. MFN and IEAs
Each of the three international environmental agreements employs
trade provisions in varying forms against non-parties to the environ-
mental agreements." These particular trade restrictions are potentially
vulnerable to challenge as a violation of GATT's Most Favoured Na-
tion (MFN) principle. 1 For example, a non-party to the lEAs but a
contracting party under GATT could challenge the import and export
restrictions against non-parties contained in CITES, the Basel Conven-
tion, and the Montreal Protocol. The challenging nation could conceiv-
ably argue that its MFN right under GATT to have its "like products"
treated equally has been violated by the prohibitions imposed on its
products by the trade provisions of the IEAs. As a result, a nation
could argue that its products are being unfairly discriminated against
by other GATT contracting parties simply because it has not joined the
lEA(s).
B. National Treatment and IEAs
The variety of import restrictions the IEAs impose on parties and
non-parties alike may also be subject to challenge as violations of the
GATT's Article III national treatment principle. 2 National treatment
requires that imported goods not be discriminated against in favor of
domestic goods through economic policies that regulate terms of sale,
use, internal taxes, etc.63 In response to the Mexican GATT challenge
to the embargo provisions of the Marine Mammal Protection Act
(MMPA) for tuna caught in the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP) in a
manner that harms dolphins, the United States relied heavily in its de-
fense on the provisions of the MMPA that are consistent with the
GATT's national treatment standard. 4 However, the GATT Panel
construed national treatment narrowly and ruled that the United States
trade measure was not justified because it distinguished the imported
product from the domestic product on the basis of whether the im-
59. Copenhagen Adjustments and Amendments, 32 I.L.M. 874 (1993).
60. See supra notes 33, 40, 53 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
61. GATT, supra note 5, art. I.
62. Id. art. III.
63. Id. art. 111:4.
64. Tuna/Dolphin Report, supra note 11, 30 I.L.M. at 1601.
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ported product's production and processing methods (PPMs) were envi-
ronmentally sound.65 The Panel took the view that the "end product"
of tuna in the can was, quite literally, tuna in the can, and no distinc-
tion using trade measures should be made based on how the product
was produced.6 The Panel noted that national treatment "calls for a
comparison of the treatment of imported tuna as a product with that of
domestic tuna as a product."6
The failure of the GATT to distinguish products based on their
PPMs will certainly have a profound impact on the ability of the Mon-
treal Protocol to ensure compliance with its requirements that parties
ban the import from non-parties of products containing and/or manu-
factured with ozone depleting substances. 68 For example, an imported
computer circuit board could be manufactured with the use of con-
trolled substances in its regular production process but it may not con-
tain controlled substances in its final form. If the circuit board, in all
other respects, is identical to its domestic counterpart, each circuit
board would be considered a "like product" for purposes of GATT
MFN and national treatment.6 9 Thus, any discrimination against the
imported "like product" based on its manufacturing process would be
considered a violation of a contracting party's obligations under the
GATT's Article I MFN and Article III national treatment standards.7 0
The prohibition on imported products containing controlled substances
may not violate MFN and national treatment if a dispute resolution
panel could be convinced that a product containing ozone depleting
substances and a product not containing ODS were not "like products."
C. Article XI Quantitative Restrictions
The import restrictions that do not satisfy national treatment and
the export restrictions of the IEAs that take the form of bans, embar-
goes, and prohibitions of trade are vulnerable to challenge as quantita-
tive restrictions under Article XI of GATT.7 1 Article X provides for
some exemptions to its prohibition on quantitative restrictions for such
things as shortages of foodstuffs and temporary domestic surpluses."2
However, none of the listed exemptions specifically acknowledges envi-
65. Id. at 1617.
66. Id. at 1618.
67. Id.
68. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
69. GATT, supra note 5, art. I, III.
70. Tuna/Dolphin Report, supra note 11, 30 I.L.M. at 1617.
71. GATT, supra note 5, art. XI.
72. Id. art. XI:2.
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ronmental concerns. 3
D. Article XX
If a party to the IEAs is challenged by a contracting party to the
GATT for violating one of the core GATT principles through its obli-
gation to the IEAs, the challenged party has recourse to the GATT
general exceptions incorporated in Article XX. 74 Nevertheless, recent
dispute resolution panel decisions have cast considerable doubt on the
effectiveness of the Article XX exceptions in defense of environmental
objectives.7 5
The Tuna/Dolphin Panel's interpretation of the applicability of
Article XX(b) and (g) to the protection of resources outside of a con-
tracting party's jurisdiction may represent the most direct impact on
the relationship between the GATT and the IEAs.7 e In that decision,
the Tuna/Dolphin Panel stated that Article XX(b) and (g) should be
limited to protecting resources within the jurisdiction of the importing
country." This interpretation raises serious concerns about the ability
of the IEAs' parties to effectively implement measures to protect the
global commons. Most of the nations that are signatories to the IEAs
have become parties to the agreements because they recognize a na-
tional interest and international responsibility in acting collectively to
discourage further global environmental degradation. Ultimately, the
citizens of the parties to CITES, the Basel Convention, and the Mon-
treal Protocol will arguably receive direct benefits from the actions
taken in pursuance of these agreements. However, the GATT, specifi-
cally Article XX(b) and (g), currently fail to acknowledge the legiti-
macy of nations acting in concert, not only to benefit their own citizens,
but also to protect citizens and resources outside their jurisdictions. 8
73. id.
74. Id. art. XX.
75. See e.g., supra note 11.
76. Tuna/Dolphin Report, supra note 11, at 1620.
77. Id. at 1619-1621. The Tuna/Dolphin panel reached its interpretation of the
inapplicability of Article XX(b) and (g) to extraterritorial environmental concerns by
relying heavily on the drafting history of the GATT. Id. However, at least one com-
mentator has noted that the original drafters were well aware of various existing inter-
national environmental agreements that sought to protect species in the global com-
mons through the use of trade measures. The author contends that the drafters' refusal
to adopt an Explanatory Note that would have limited the scope of Article XX(b) to
"domestic life or health" is particularly indicative of their intent that Article XX(b) be
applicable extraterritorially. Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Excep-
tions in GATT Article XX, 25 J. WORLD TRADE 37, 52 (1991).
78. Id.
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Article XX(b) provides an exception for the adoption or enforce-
ment of measures "[n]ecessary to protect human, animal or plant life
or health."179 The GATT Secretariat has recently noted that whether "a
particular trade measure is 'necessary' involves one or both of two con-
siderations: whether other measures consistent with the General Agree-
ment are reasonably available to achieve the goal and, if not, whether it
is the least trade- distorting way of achieving the goal." 80 In the Tuna/
Dolphin Report, the Panel ruled that the United States had not demon-
strated that it had exhausted all of the available options to achieve its
goal before imposing the tuna embargo upon Mexico.81 As a result, the
measures taken by the United States could not be deemed "necessary"
to protect the life or health of humans, animals, or plants.82 The Panel
emphasized that a multilateral solution to the concern over dolphin
deaths as a result of tuna harvesting in the ETP would have been much
more appropriate. 83
The Tuna/Dolphin Panel's stated preference for multilateral solu-
tions is particularly ironic in the context of the IEAs. In early negotia-
tions surrounding the use of trade provisions against non-parties to the
Montreal Protocol, the parties specifically requested a GATT Secreta-
riat review of the trade restriction proposal to assess its consistency
with GATT.84 At the time, the GATT Secretariat representative de-
clared that the trade measures would be upheld as exceptions under
Article XX(b) and (g). 85 However, as late as 1992, the GATT Secreta-
riat has implied that the trade measures of the Montreal Protocol are
discriminatory to non-parties.86 Presumably, the trade restrictions
against non-parties in the Basel Convention and CITES could come
under similar challenges for not using the least trade-restrictive means
and/or exhausting all other options available for achieving their respec-
tive environmental goals. Thus, the GATT Secretariat appears to be
encouraging the use of multilateral strategies to address global environ-
mental problems while simultaneously undermining their effectiveness
by implying that many of their trade-related principles are not compat-
ible with the GATT.
The scope of the exception in Article XX(g) for trade measures
79. GATT, supra note 5, art. XX(b).
80. GATT TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.
81. Tuna/Dolphin, supra note 11, 5.28, at 1620.
82. id.
83. id.
84. BENEDICK, supra note 26, at 91.
85. Id.
86. GATT TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT REPORT, supra note 2, at 12.
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"relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources" has also
been limited by recent panel interpretations. 87 One panel found that a
trade measure "had to be primarily aimed at the conservation of an
exhaustible resource to be considered as 'relating to' conservation
within the meaning of Article XX(g)."88 Thus, a challenging party
could argue that the trade provisions of the lEAs are not "primarily
aimed" at conservation, but are included in the agreements to serve the
commercial interests of the parties to the lEAs at the expense of non-
parties. A challenging nation may also argue that the trade provisions
are primarily aimed at encouraging participation in the TEA and are
not directed at improving resource conservation. One observer has even
gone so far as to suggest that a GATT panel could refuse to recognize
the atmosphere as an "exhaustible resource," and therefore reject an
Article XX(g) exception in the Montreal Protocol context. 89
V. THE lEAs, GATT, AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW
OF TREATIES
Several commentators have suggested that the traditional interna-
tional law of treaties may establish priority of the TEAs over the GATT
sufficient to enable the lEAs to withstand a challenge based on the
obligations of the GATT.90 However, reliance on this approach involves
several limitations and is complicated by major areas of uncertainty91
in the interpretation of the language and practice of the lEAs, GATT,
and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna
Convention) .92
Article 30 of the Vienna Convention provides that when the provi-
sions of two treaties concerning the same subject matter conflict as be-
tween parties to both treaties, the later-in-time prevails, unless one
treaty explicitly notes otherwise. 3 The requirements that the treaties
87. GATT, supra note 5, art. XX(g).
88. Canada -Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon,
supra note 11, at 114 (emphasis added).
89. Janet McDonald, Greening the GATT: Harmonizing Free Trade And Envi-
ronmental Protection In The New World Order, 23 ENVTL. L. 398, 452 (1993).
90. See James Cameron and Jonathan Robinson, The Use of Trade Provisions In
International Environmental Agreements and Their Compatibility with the GA TT, 2
Y. B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 3, 16 (1992).
91. Id.
92. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 22,
1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) (entered into force Jan. 27,
1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
93. Id. art. 30.
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concern the same "subject matter" and that the parties are members of
both treaties may pose some difficulties for the IEAs. The subject mat-
ter of the lEAs (e.g. conservation, ozone protection, hazardous waste
transportation) is not necessarily the same as the subject matter that is
covered by the GATT (liberalization of world trade). 94 Nevertheless,
the existence of a conflict between the two treaties, presumably con-
cerning trade measures, may be sufficient evidence to suggest that the
two treaties share overlapping subject matter.
However, the requirement that the parties be members of both
treaties will severely limit the effectiveness of this approach, as non-
parties will undoubtedly pose the majority of the challenges to the
trade provisions of the IEAs. This situation exists because it is unlikely
that a party that has voluntarily committed to the terms of the TEA
will subsequently challenge the agreement's consistency with the
GATT. In addition, the majority of trade restrictions of the lEAs are
specifically directed at non-parties. 95 The Vienna Convention also stipu-
lates that if two nations are parties to one treaty, the commonly shared
treaty takes precedence over a treaty to which only one nation is a
party. 96 Under likely GATT challenges, that common treaty will be the
GATT and its Protocol of Provisional Application.9 7
On the other hand, the Vienna Convention implies that treaties
worded specifically take precedence over treaties worded more gener-
ally.98 An additional factor that may benefit the IEAs is that none of
the lEAs have explicitly indicated deference to the GATT in their
texts. 99 However, regardless of whether or not deference to the GATT
can be established in the current IEAs, the significance of resisting all
references to the GATT in future IEAs should not be overlooked. 100
The potential long-term implications of language implying deference to
94. See Cameron and Robinson, supra note 90, at 16.
95. See supra notes 33, 40, 53 and accompanying text.
96. Vienna Convention, supra note 92, art. 30 (4)(b).
97. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
98. Vienna Convention, supra note 92, art. 30 (2).
99. Cameron and Robinson, supra note 90, at 18. The authors note that there is
no provision within CITES that indicates a party's express deference to their GATT
obligations. Id. However, this point is far from settled. For example, CITES Article
XIV:2 states: "The provisions of the present Convention shall in no way affect the
provisions of any domestic measures or the obligations of Parties deriving from any
treaty, convention, or international agreement relating to other aspects of trade....
CITES, supra note 4, art. XIV:2 at 1093 (emphasis added).
100. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework
Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849
(1992) [hereinafter Climate Change Convention].
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the GATT should be carefully analyzed by the negotiators of future
IEAs. 101
However, the major difficulty associated with relying on the hier-
archial treaty argument is that the GATT is constantly evolving
through practice and further negotiation.1"2 The current round of
GATT negotiations, the Uruguay Round, will expand the GATT in
several areas such as intellectual property and services, and dramati-
cally alter its dispute resolution processes.103 The Uruguay Round also
proposes to establish a Multilateral Trade Organization (MTO) that
will provide "legal personality" for the GATT.'" If the Uruguay
Round is eventually adopted, an argument could be presented that the
later-in-time treaty is the GATT, not the IEAs.
VI. THE GATT WAIVER
A. History and Practice
Article XXV, paragraph 5 of the GATT contains what one com-
mentator has labeled, "[P]erhaps the most important single power of
the contracting parties . ."'"O The text of Article XXV:5 reads:
In exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for in this
Agreement, the contracting parties may waive an obligation im-
posed upon a contracting party by this Agreement; Provided
that any such decision shall be approved by a two-thirds major-
ity of the votes cast and that such majority shall comprise more
than half of the contracting parties. The contracting parties
may also by such a vote
(i) define certain categories of exceptional circumstances to
which other voting requirements shall apply for the waiver of
obligations, and
(ii) prescribe such criteria as may be necessary for the applica-
tion of this paragraph. 10 6
101. D. Goldberg, Trade and the Climate Convention: Beware of GATT, CIEL
MEMO, (Feb. 1992) (on file with author).
102. Cameron and Robinson, supra note 90, at 16.
103. Trade Negotiations Committee, Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/
FA (Dec. 20, 1991) [hereinafter Dunkel Draft].
104. Dunkel Draft, Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization
(Annex IV), supra note 103, at 91. Art. VIII:I of the draft MTO states: "The MTO
shall have legal personality." Id. at 95.
105. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 541.
106. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXV:5.
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The drafting history of the GATT indicates that the waiver was
designed to be broad and apply to all obligations under the general
agreement.1 0 7 One GATT Working Party interpreted the character of
the waiver in stating:
The Working Party is of the view that the text of paragraph
5(a) of Article XXV is general in character; it allows the con-
tracting parties to waive any obligations imposed upon the con-
tracting parties by the Agreement in exceptional circumstances
not provided for in the Agreement, and places no limitations on
the exercise of that right. 0 8
There has been no attempt to formulate a definition of "excep-
tional circumstances."'' 0 9 However, the waiver provision does provide a
measure of flexibility in that contracting parties may define "specific
categories of exceptional circumstances" and/or "prescribe such crite-
ria as may be necessary for the application of the [waiver] para-
graph."110 In general, the historical practice of the waiver provision has
been that a waiver will be granted when a contracting party secures the
required number of votes."1
The broad and flexible authority of the waiver provision to exempt
a contracting party from its GATT obligations has led many con-
tracting parties to view its application with concern. In 1957, the con-
tracting parties issued a decision entitled "Guiding Principles to be Fol-
lowed by the Contracting Parties in Considering Applications for
Waivers.""' 2 This decision called for a 30-day notice period and full
consultation before waivers were considered. It also called for an an-
nual report and review of the waiver in operation. 1" Most of the appre-
hension, and arguably the attraction, surrounding the waiver provision
is due to its potential use as a de facto amendment power to the
GATT." 4 The Article XXX GATT amendment process requires unan-
imous endorsement and does not bind those contracting parties that re-
107. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 543.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 544.
110. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXV:5(i),(ii).
111. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 544.
112. Guiding Principles to be Followed by the Contracting Parties in Considering
Applications for Waivers, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE: BASIC IN-
STRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 25 (5th ed. Supp. 1957).
113. Id. at 27.
114. John H. Jackson, NACEPT REPORT, supra note 1, at 106.
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fuse to accept the amendment.' As a result of the cumbersome
amendment requirements, many contracting parties have viewed an
open-ended and/or time-limited waiver as an efficient means of chang-
ing GATT rules for a temporary period of time.""
In partial response to these concerns, several waivers have required
regular reports outlining the commercial progress that has occurred
during the waiver's implementation. 1 7 Some waivers include expiration
dates and others expressly reserve the right of contracting parties to
initiate dispute resolution proceedings in accordance with Article XX-
III if a waiver is allegedly being abused by a contracting party. 1 8 In-
deed, the proposed changes to Article XXV as expressed in the Uru-
guay Round Dunkel Draft require a contracting party seeking a waiver
to provide a detailed statement of its policy objective." 9 The Dunkel
Draft also provides that a decision of the contracting parties granting a
waiver "IS]hall state the exceptional circumstances justifying the deci-
sion, the terms and conditions governing the application of the waiver,
and the date on which the waiver shall terminate."'' 2 An express provi-
sion granting contracting parties access to the dispute resolution pro-
cess for waiver disagreements is also codified in the Dunkel Draft.'
12
In the past, GATT contracting parties have allowed other con-
tracting parties to waive their General Agreement obligations for a va-
riety of reasons.12 2 Waivers have been used to allow import quotas on
agricultural goods, 123 special regional agreements2 4 and the granting
of tariff preferences to developing countries by developed countries.' 2
115. Id. A unanimous amendment has never succeeded. Id.
116. Id. at 107.
117. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 547.
118. id.
119. Dunkel Draft, Article XXV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
supra note 103, at V.1.
120. Id. at V.1, 2.
121. Id. at V.1, 5.
122. See generally, JACKSON, supra note 15, at 549-52.
123. U.S. Waiver for Agricultural Adjustment Act, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE: BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 32 (3rd ed.
Supp. 1955).
124. U.S.-Can. Auto Pact, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE: BASIC
INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 37 (14th ed. Supp. 1966).
125. 1971 Generalized System of Preferences Waiver, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE: BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 24 (18th ed.
Supp. 1972).
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B. Waiver and the IEAs: Inappropriate Response to Potential
Conflict?
The effectiveness of a waiver as an adequate means of ensuring
consistency between the GATT and CITES, the Basel Convention, and
the Montreal Protocol, has engendered healthy skepticism."2 6 Some
critics have found the proposition of a waiver undesirable because it
would provide no assurances as to the consistency of trade provisions
with GATT in future IEAs. 127 Procedurally, a waiver to these three
specific IEAs could institute a precedent whereby all future IEAs seek-
ing to use trade provisions would have to receive approval from the
GATT before they were able to proceed. " Closely related to this point
is the overall impression that a GATT waiver has on the legitimacy of
the IEAs. The grant of a waiver reinforces the perception, particularly
frustrating to the environmental community, that the GATT and the
goals of liberalized trade it represents have priority over all other con-
cerns. " A waiver, it is argued, would only perpetuate the status quo
deference to the GATT on environmental matters. In addition, the
waiver's applicability to the IEAs has also been criticized in that the
GATT can never provide assurances that an existing or future IEA's
trade provisions will satisfy the "exceptional circumstances" criteria of
Article XXV:5.130
Other observers have pointed to the fundamental problem that the
grant of a waiver by the contracting parties is effectively a de facto
acceptance of the IEA by those non-parties who have resisted joining
the agreement at an earlier date.' 3 ' It would be unlikely that those
nations who have continually resisted becoming signatories to the IEAs
would suddenly indirectly accept the obligations of the IEAs through a
GATT waiver.13 2 Another important issue is the potential of a non-
party to the IEAs to take a reservation to the GATT waiver vote in an
attempt to "reserve" its GATT rights and obligations.' 33 This "reserva-
tion" could severely limit a waiver's effectiveness primarily because of
the propensity of the IEA's important trade provisions to specifically
target non-parties to the agreements.134
126. See e.g., McDonald, supra note 89, at 464 and CIEL MEMORANDUM
(Draft), (on file with the author) (Feb. 1992) [hereinafter CIEL TEA Memo].




131. CIEL lEA Memo, supra note 126, at 2.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 3.
134. See supra notes 53, 54 and accompanying text.
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C. Trade Measures in IEAs: GA TT's Response and the
International Context
The GATT contracting parties have not been completely silent on
the use of trade provisions, in existing multilateral environmental agree-
ments. 135 In October 1991, despite considerable consternation and mis-
givings among the contracting parties, the GATT Council requested
the activation of the GATT Group on Environmental Measures and
International Trade (EMIT).1"6 The GATT EMIT Group had origi-
nally been established in 1971 but had never met until November
1991.137
Most of the concern surrounding the reemergence of the EMIT
Group can be attributed to a combination of the international context
in which it arose and the developing world's deeply rooted distrust of
the developed world's trade policies. The EMIT Group was reconvened
in the wake of the Tuna/Dolphin Panel report in which many con-
tracting parties had openly expressed their support for the Panel's deci-
sion.138 Several contracting parties viewed the decision as an appropri-
ate response to what was perceived as the growing tendency of the
United States and other nations to impose unilateral trade embargos on
goods produced extraterritorially in the name of environmental protec-
tion. ' Thus, the Tuna/Dolphin decision quickly became an interna-
tional lightning rod for the contracting parties' traditional aversion to
unilateral trade sanctions.
In addition to the perception that environmental protection policies
were increasingly employing unilateral trade provisions extraterritori-
ally, developing country GATT members in particular expressed appre-
hension of the trade and environment relationship as a whole.' "4 Much
of the South's concern can be traced to the historical inequities inher-
ent in the North/South trade dynamic. The 1992 UNDP Development
Report estimated that developing countries' GNPs are reduced by 3 %
or an annual loss of $75 billion as a result of tariff and non-tariff barri-
135. See GATT TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT REPORT, supra note 2, and GATT
Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade, Interim Report by the
Chairman, Ambassador H. Ukawa (Japan), Dec. 3, 1992 [hereinafter GATT EMIT
Report].
136. GATT EMIT Report, supra note 135, at 4.
137. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
138. Tuna/Dolphin Report, supra note 11, "Submissions by Third Parties", 30
I.L.M. at 1610.
139. Id.
140. GATT EMIT Report, supra note 135, at 4.
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ers imposed on their goods by developed countries.14' In addition to
raising concerns of national sovereignty, many developing countries
view the imposition of stringent environmental laws applied extraterri-
torially as illegitimate non-tariff barriers to trade.142 The enforcement
of the North's environmental policies upon the South has been labeled
"eco-imperialism" and has been increasingly interpreted as one more
means of stifling economic development and trade in the South.143
Thus, within this volatile international context, the GATT EMIT
Group has managed to examine in a very generic manner the relation-
ship between the lEAs and GATT principles.144 The Group's discus-
sions have focused on the application of trade measures in lEAs against
non-parties and the need for a more comprehensive interpretation of
the GATT principles that apply to the IEAs. 14 5 There have also been
recent indications that the contracting parties favor an "all or noth-
ing", (as opposed to allowing some contracting parties to take reserva-
tions) acceptance of the trade provisions in CITES, the Basel Conven-
tion, and the Montreal Protocol.'" Although it has not been expressly
mentioned, an Article XXV:5 waiver would be the most effective
means of effectuating such a comprehensive acceptance of the trade
measures in the IEAs.
D. GATT Waiver: Appropriate Response to Potential Conflict?
Despite the important criticisms of the waiver approach as a solu-
tion to the inconsistencies inherent in the GATT-IEA relationship, the
potential benefits a waiver can accomplish and the realities of the pre-
sent international political climate argue strongly for the adoption of a
waiver by the GATT contracting parties. The current uncertainty sur-
rounding the GATT-IEA relationship is unacceptable. In the past, the
GATT contracting parties have shown a willingness to recognize excep-
141. 1992 United Nations Development Programme: Development Report, 6
(1992).
142. Gerald Brooks, Environmental Economics and International Trade: An
Adaptive Approach, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 277, 288 (1993).
143. Id.
144. GATT EMIT Report, supra note 135, at 1 12. The Group's preliminary
agenda included: (i) trade provisions of existing multilateral environmental agreements
vis-a-vis GATT principles and provisions; (ii) the transparency of trade-related envi-
ronmental measures; and (iii) possible trade effects of packaging and labelling require-
ments. Id.
145. Id.
146. GATT Committee Continues Discussions of Melding Trade. Environment
Matters, 16 INT'L ENVTL. REP. (BNA) no. 3, at 87 (Feb. 10, 1993).
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tions to their GATT obligations for such issues as national security, " "
international peace, 4 8 and to enforce trade sanctions against South Af-
rica. " "9 Clearly, the importance of legitimate efforts to protect the
global commons for present and future generations stands as an equally
critical undertaking worthy of unique treatment. The political climate
and tenor of discussions within the GATT EMIT Group indicates that
the time may be ripe for a well-structured waiver of the trade measures
employed in CITES, the Basel Convention, and the Montreal Proto-
col. 160 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between
the United States, Canada, and Mexico, has incorporated an express
right of the parties to enforce the trade obligations of the above-men-
tioned IEAs.' 6 ' The trade measures of the IEAs will take precedence
over NAFTA provisions where, when a party has a choice between
equally effective and reasonably available means of complying with
such trade obligations, the party chooses the alternative that is the least
inconsistent with the NAFTA. 152 This language, in general, is too def-
erential to the overall obligations of the trade agreement to be incorpo-
rated into an effective waiver, but it still represents an important prece-
dent for the inclusion of the goals of IEAs in regional trade
agreements. The GATT waiver is a powerful and flexible tool for initi-
ating GATT reform without the need to resort to the cumbersome
amendment process.' 53 It should not be seen only as a substitute for
meaningful environmental reform within the GATT but also as a step-
ping stone to more wholesale structural changes of the GATT.
The implementation of a waiver on behalf of specific IEAs estab-
lishes a positive precedent within GATT for present and future envi-
ronmental agreements. Most of the tension and misunderstanding that
has developed between the trade and environmental communities is the
result of mutual distrust of objectives.' 54 A waiver presents the oppor-
tunity to demonstrate, in practice, that the two disciplines can coexist
and support one another. The establishment of a waiver for three envi-
147. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXI.
148. Id.
149. John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congru-
ence or Conflict? 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 4 1227, 1244, n.47 (1992).
150. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
151. North American Free Trade Agreement, December 17, 1992, U.S.- Can.-
Mex., Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [herein-
after NAFTA].
152. Id.
153. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
154. See Michael B. Smith, GATT Trade, and the Environment 23 ENVTL. L. 3,
533 (1993).
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ronmental agreements will facilitate the employment of trade provi-
sions in future IEAs and may underscore the importance of trade mea-
sures to the effectiveness of environmental protection before future
GATT dispute panels. 155 This result will not perpetuate the status quo
deference to GATT on environmental matters.156 On the contrary, a
waiver will express in concrete terms the legitimate goals of interna-
tional environmental agreements and provide acknowledgement that
particular trade measures are the best means of achieving those envi-
ronmental objectives.
The major obstacle to the successful grant of a waiver will be the
perception by non-parties to the IEAs that a GATT waiver constitutes
a de facto acceptance of the lEA.157 In the case of CITES and the
Montreal Protocol, the number of countries who are parties to both the
environmental agreements and the GATT may be sufficient to achieve
the necessary two-thirds vote to secure a waiver. 158 In the situation of
the Basel Convention and future IEAs, it can be argued that the pres-
entation to the GATT Council of an application to waive the trade
obligations of these agreements coupled with the diplomatic pressure of
those countries seeking the waiver may be enough to persuade the re-
calcitrant nations to approve a waiver. The presentation of the IEA in
the GATT forum may demonstrate in explicit fashion the extent of a
non-party's international isolation on an issue and thereby initiate a
reevaluation of its respective policy. In response to those non-parties
seeking to take a reservation of their GATT rights on a waiver vote,
the GATT contracting parties have the capability under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties to require that the reservation be
accepted by all contracting parties before it is declared valid.15 9
E. How Should a Waiver Be Structured?
In order for a waiver to secure passage by the contracting parties
and be effective, it must be well-structured. The challenge will be to
frame the language and conditions of the waiver in such a way as to
guarantee its acceptance by the contracting parties while at the same
time avoiding limits on its overall effectiveness. One approach to devel-
oping such a waiver would include the following characteristics:
(i) The waiver should be specific. At present, the waiver should
155. CIEL lEA Memo, supra note 131, at 3.
156. See supra part VI(b).
157. Id.
158. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXV:5.
159. Vienna Convention, supra note 92, art. XX:2, 3.
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only name CITES, the Basel Convention, and the Montreal Protocol
without showing prejudice to any current or future IEAs that may
come under the waiver at a later date. In keeping the focus on these
three well-established agreements, the risk of "overwhelming" the con-
tracting parties with IEAs that include trade provisions will be mini-
mized. The naming of these agreements, as opposed to a blanket waiver
for all IEAs, also presents the GATT Council with established lan-
guage it can clearly refer to and scrutinize. Specificity will also prevent
the waiver from coming under false challenge as a non-tariff barrier at
a later date.
(ii) The waiver should have a time limit. An open-ended waiver
would be ideal, but its chances of being approved by the contracting
parties are small. The waiver should be for at least five years with an
express provision that nothing will preclude its extension at the end of
the initial five-year period.
(iii) The waiver should be comprehensive. It should specifically ap-
ply to all of the trade measures authorized by the three IEAs and not
just the mandatory trade measures included in the agreements. It
should also apply to unilateral trade measures taken by parties to the
IEAs as long as they are within the boundaries of the authority granted
in the IEAs. Comprehensiveness also requires that nothing in the
waiver should preclude the addition of future IEAs to the waiver provi-
sions at any time during its existence or interfere with provisions
granted in regional agreements. It would also be preferable not to in-
clude the language of the proviso in NAFTA requiring an alternative
trade measure of the IEAs to be "the least inconsistent with the other
provisions of this Agreement."16 0 On the contrary, the waiver language
should assert the contracting parties deference to the trade measures in
the IEAs.
VII. CONCLUSION
The current potential for conflict between the trade measures of
the IEAs and the principles of GATT must be resolved. A continuation
of the status quo will result in the simultaneous failure to recognize the
critical role trade measures play in the ultimate success of international
environmental agreements and an intensification of global trade fric-
tion. The adoption of a GATT waiver should not be understood as a
replacement for meaningful environmental reform within GATT, nor
should it inhibit further discussion of the potential fundamental conflict
between the GATT system and the goals of global environmental pro-
160. See NAFTA, supra note 151, art. 104(1).
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tection generally.1 61
In the long-term, the GATT must undertake serious environmen-
tal reform in a number of areas. It must become a more open and
transparent multilateral institution. Environmental NGOs should be
consulted in all GATT discussions and GATT dispute resolution panels
addressing the links between trade and the environment. Innovative
policies such as adjusting tariff schedules based on the pollution inten-
sity of products should be examined.' The legitimacy of applying
countervailing duties (CVDs) against environmentally unsound im-
ported products that gain competitive advantages over domestic prod-
ucts should also be seriously considered.1 63
Despite the important reforms these ideas represent, the need for
an immediate and practical resolution is paramount. The GATT waiver
is an effective tool for ensuring that objectives of the trade provisions of
IEAs are achieved. The waiver will not be susceptible to the glacial
pace of GATT negotiations and it offers a short-term means of dif-
fusing North/South tension over trade and environmental policy. A
waiver has the capability of fulfilling a critical role as bridge to signifi-
cant environmental reform of the GATT. In the current international
climate, the GATT waiver represents the most practical method of se-
curing immediately the legitimate environmental protection goals of the
international environmental agreements.
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